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Abstract. We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under
uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth
between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of
some public good. We study the corresponding social planner problem and the case of strategic
interaction between the agents and we characterize the optimal investment policies by a set of
necessary and sufficient stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Suitably combining arguments from
Duality Theory and the General Theory of Stochastic Processes, we prove an abstract existence
result for a Nash equilibrium of our public good contribution game. Also, we show that our
model exhibits a dynamic free rider effect. We explicitly evaluate it in a symmetric Black-Scholes
setting with Cobb-Douglas utilities and we show that uncertainty and irreversibility of public
good provisions do not affect free-riding.
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1 Introduction
We study a very general stochastic continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution
under portfolio constraints for an economy with a fixed number of agents. Each agent chooses
how to allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contri-
butions to increase the stock of some public good. In order to determine the (unique) efficient
allocation we first consider the corresponding social planner problem. As in other settings, we
will later see that its solution cannot be obtained by strategic interaction between the agents
because of a classical free rider effect: agents enjoy the contributions of others but do not take
into account other’s benefits when making their own contributions (see, e.g., Cornes and Sandler
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[20] or Laffont [35]). Our analysis is supported by establishing a set of necessary and sufficient
stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimal investment policies, which in turn lead to the
identification of a universal signal process that triggers the optimal public good contributions.
We provide an explicit solution for a symmetric Black-Scholes-type setting with Cobb-Douglas
utilities, which enables a detailed evaluation of the free-rider effect. In this case the level of
uncertainty and irreversibility of public good provisions surprisingly do not influence free-riding.
Finally we combine arguments from Duality Theory (cf., e.g., Rockafellar [46] for an overview)
and the General Theory of Stochastic Processes (cf. Dellacherie and Meyer [21]) to prove an
abstract existence result for a Nash equilibrium of our dynamic public good contribution game.
In the economic literature there is a long tradition of research on public good contribution
and free rider problems started by the static analyses of Olson [42] and Samuelson [47], and fur-
ther developed by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian [13], Groves and Ledyard [28] (in the context
of a general equilibrium model), Palfrey and Rosenthal [43], [44], among others. Later on, free
riding has received increasing attention and the first papers on public good contribution were
generalized in many directions. We recall some of them. The dynamic free rider effect is formal-
ized by Varian [50] in a complete information game of voluntary contribution to a public good.
It is shown in Varian [50] that if agents contribute sequentially (that is, each agent contributes
after observing the contributions made by the earlier agents), then the total contribution gen-
erated never exceeds the total contribution made by agents playing simultaneously, i.e. without
observing the contribution made by any other player; Markov equilibria in dynamic free rider
problems are tackled for instance in the early papers Fershtman and Nitzan [26] and Levhari
and Mirman [36] in which the authors study equilibria in linear strategies for a differential game
with quadratic costs and show the implications of the free rider effect for the steady state; a
dynamic private provision of a discrete public good with imperfect information about individ-
ual actions is considered in Marx and Matthews [40]; a direct extension to a Bayesian setting
of the model in Varian [50] is addressed in Bag and Roy [4]; irreversibility constraints on the
public good contribution are introduced in the literature on ‘monotone games’ by assuming that
players’ individual actions can only increase over time. We refer to Lockwood and Thomas [37],
Matthews [41] and, more recently, to Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey [12], among others. Sev-
eral papers also considered public good provision problems under uncertainty. In Austen-Smith
[2], for example, the authors argue that if uncertainty is modeled as a risk (additive uncertainty),
then risk-aversion (concavity of utility) increases contributions to the public good. In Gradstein,
Nitzan and Slutsky [27] and Sandler, Sterbenz and Posnett [48] it is instead shown that in a
general equilibrium setting risk-aversion is not sufficient to guarantee that contributions to a
public good increase. The provision would only increase if the marginal utility was concave
as well. On the other hand, Eichberger and Kelsey [23] conclude that free riders do not like
uncertainty when the latter is modeled as Knightian uncertainty rather than risk. Recently, the
originally deterministic setting of Fershtman and Nitzan [26] has been extended by Wang [51].
A diffusion term is included in the controlled dynamics of project value and it is shown that
the free rider effect is emphasized by uncertainty. Subgame consistent cooperative solutions for
public good provisions by asymmetric agents with transferable payoffs in a stochastic differential
game framework are finally considered in Yeung and Petrosyan [52].
Here we study a general stochastic, continuous-time public good contribution problem for an
economy with a finite number of agents and with an irreversibility constraint on the public good
contribution. In a symmetric Black-Scholes setting with Cobb-Douglas utilities we are able to
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explicitly evaluate the free rider effect and thus to study the role played by the irreversibility
of the public good contributions and the uncertainty in the model. From the mathematical
point of view our problem falls into the class of continuous-time, optimal stochastic control
problems with both monotone and absolutely continuous control processes. We analyze it by
a first order condition approach that may be thought of as a stochastic, infinite-dimensional
generalization of the classical Kuhn-Tucker conditions of real analysis. Our method does not
require any Markovian or diffusive hypothesis, and in this sense it represents a substitute in non-
Markovian frameworks for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. In the latest years several
papers tackled singular stochastic control problems by means of such an approach. We refer
to Bank and Riedel [10], [11] for an intertemporal utility maximization problem with Hindy,
Huang and Kreps preferences; to Bank [6], Chiarolla and Ferrari [16], Ferrari [25] and Riedel
and Su [45] for the irreversible investment problem of a monopolistic firm with both limited and
unlimited resources; to Chiarolla, Ferrari and Riedel [17] for the social planner problem in a
market with N firms and limited resources; to Steg [49] for a general capital accumulation game
with open loop strategies.
We start analyzing the public good contribution problem by taking the point of view of
a fictitious social planner who aims to maximize the expected total welfare of the economy.
Assuming prices of the public good and the private consumption are given by discounted expo-
nential martingales, we prove existence and uniqueness of the social planner’s optimal policy.
The optimal investment strategy is completely characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient
stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions and it is given in terms of the unique solution of a backward
stochastic equation in the spirit of Bank and El Karoui [7]. We then consider strategic inter-
action between the agents in our economy and we show that any Nash equilibrium is again the
solution of a set of first order conditions for optimality. Suitably combining Duality Theory and
the General Theory of Stochastic Processes, we are able to apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg
Theorem to prove an abstract existence result for a Nash equilibrium (see our Definition 4.1 and
Theorem 2.6 below).
From the economic point of view, it is worth to note that our model exhibits a dynamic free
rider effect. We study it in detail comparing the explicit forms of the social planner’s optimal
policy and the Nash equilibrium in a symmetric Black-Scholes framework with Cobb-Douglas
utilities. As a new interesting result, we show that irreversibility of the public good contributions
and the level of uncertainty in the model do not influence free-riding.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model and we state our main
findings. In Section 3 we consider the social planner problem, proving existence and uniqueness
of its solution and introducing the stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality. The public
good contribution game is addressed in Section 4 where we prove an abstract existence result
for Nash equilibrium and discuss the dynamic free rider effect. Finally we refer to Appendix A
for some technical proofs.
2 Model and Main Results
We consider a continuous-time stochastic economy with a finite number of agents over a fixed
time horizon T < +∞. Each agent, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, chooses how to allocate his wealth
wi between private consumption xi and arbitrary but nondecreasing cumulative contributions Ci
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to increase the stock of some public good. One may think that the agents are financed entirely
by their labour or by holding a portfolio of financial instruments. Hence they are part of a more
complex financial market that, however, we do not model explicitly. We assume a continuous
revelation of information about an exogenous source of uncertainty and we allow the agents to
condition their decisions on the accumulated information. Formally, let (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[0,T ],P) be
a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness.
For the moment we do not make any Markovian assumption.
Let ψx(t) and ψc(t) denote the price of the private good and the price of the contribution
to the public good at time t, respectively. Each agent can make his own investment choice by
picking (xi, Ci), i = 1, . . . , n, in the nonempty, convex set
Bwi :=
{
(xi, Ci) : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R2+ adapted, s.t. Ci is right-continuous, nondecreasing,
Ci(0−) = 0 P-a.s., and E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
≤ wi
}
.
(2.1)
Here E[
∫ T
0 ψx(t)x
i(t)dt +
∫ T
0 ψc(t)dC
i(t)] ≤ wi defines the budget constraint of agent i, and
prices are actually understood as state-price deflators. The agents are assumed to derive some
expected, time-separable utility from the private good and the aggregate public good process
C :=
∑
i∈{1,...,n}C
i. Given a combination of strategies from
∏n
i=1 Bwi , agent i’s utility is
U i(xi, Ci;C−i) := E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsui(xi(t), C(t)) dt
]
, (2.2)
where C−i :=
∑
j∈{1,...,n}\iC
j , r is an exogenous discount factor and the random fields ui :
Ω× R+ × R+ 7→ R+ describe instantaneous utilities. In the economic literature on public good
contribution it is customary to assume quasilinear utilities (see, e.g., [50]). Here, instead, we
work with general concave utilities as specified in the following
Assumption 1.
i. The optional process r := {r(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is such that 0 < κr ≤ r(ω, t) ≤ kr, P-a.s.,
t ∈ [0, T ], for some constants κr and kr.
ii. The optional processes ψc := {ψc(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} and ψx := {ψx(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} are such that
ψc(t) := e
αc(t)Ec(t) and ψx(t) := eαx(t)Ex(t), for some continuous and uniformly bounded
processes αc and αx, and for some exponential martingales Ec and Ex.
iii. For any ω ∈ Ω, the mapping (x, c) 7→ ui(ω, x, c) is increasing and strictly concave on R2+,
as well as twice continuously differentiable on the open cone R2++. Moreover, it satisfies
the Inada conditions
uix(ω, 0+, c) = +∞ and uix(ω,+∞, c) = 0
for any c > 0.
iv. For (x, c) ∈ R2+ fixed, ω 7→ ui(ω, x, c) is progressively measurable.
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v. The family
(
e−
∫ t
0 r(ω,s) dsui(ω, x(ω, t), C(ω, t)), (x,C) ∈ Bw
)
is P⊗dt-uniformly integrable
for any w ∈ R+.
It is easy to see that Assumption 1.ii. is satisfied, for example, by the classical benchmark
case of a geometric Brownian motion. The Inada conditions guarantee that there will be
an interior solution for optimal private consumption. Note that since ui is concave in c,
e−
∫ t
0 r(ω,s) dsuic(ω, x(ω, t), C(ω, t)) is P ⊗ dt-integrable for any (x,C) ∈ Bwi . Finally, under As-
sumption 1 the payoff in (2.2) is well defined and finite for any i = 1, . . . , n.
We now review our main findings.
Our first main result characterizes the efficient allocation in terms of an index process l∗ that
is independent of agents and serves as a signal process for the aggregate level of the public good
(see Section 3). Such an index process has appeared in other contexts as well, as for example
for Hindy–Huang–Kreps preferences (see Bank and Riedel [10]) and irreversible investment (cf.
Riedel and Su [45]). It can be characerized by a backward equation.
The level l∗(t) can be viewed as the level the society would like to have if it started from
scratch at time t. As investment into the public good is irreversible, the actual stock of public
good is the running maximum of the index process. With the help of the first-order conditions,
we can also express the private demand as a function of its price and the index process.
Theorem 2.1. Let Assumption 1 hold and define for every i = 1, . . . , n gi(·, c) as the inverse of
uix(·, c), as well as hi(ψ, c) := uic(g(ψ, c), c) for any ψ, c > 0. Suppose each hi satisfies the Inada
conditions
hi(ψ, 0+) = +∞ and hi(ψ,+∞) = 0.
Then the unique solution of the social planner’s problem (3.1) is
C∗(t) =
∑n
i=1C
i∗(t) = (sup0≤u≤t l∗(u)) ∨ 0
xi∗(t) = gi
(
λ
γi
ψx(t), C∗(t)
)
, i = 1, . . . , n
(2.3)
for a suitable Lagrange multiplier λ > 0 and where the optional, upper right-continuous process
l∗(t) uniquely solves
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), sup
τ≤u≤t
l∗(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λψc(τ)1{τ<T} (2.4)
for any stopping time τ ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s.
By the flexibility of private consumption, xi∗ equates price and marginal utility at the optimum.
The Inada condition on hi, which is a strictly decreasing function by the strict concavity of ui, is
used to guarantee that the backward equation (2.4) for l∗ involving marginal utility with respect
to C∗ has a solution.
For economic applications, the following homogeneous model allowing an explicit solution
is quite important. Utilities are of the Cobb–Douglas type, and prices are exponential Le´vy
processes, including the important special case of geometric Brownian motion. Our model has
utilities ui(x, c) = x
αcβ
α+β , i = 1, . . . , n, for some α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that α + β < 1, and prices
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ψx(t) = e
−rtEx(t), ψc(t) = e−rtEc(t), for some exponential Le´vy processes1 Ec and Ex and an
interest rate r > 0.
Proposition 2.2. Define the processes
γ(t) :=
1
A
[(α+ β
α
)
Ex(t) inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
, (2.5)
θ(t) := sup
0≤s≤t
(
E−
1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)
)
, (2.6)
and the constants
l0 :=
nw
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
] (2.7)
and
A := E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E−
α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du
]
(2.8)
with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
.
Then, if l0 and A are finite, the social planner’s optimal solution is such that
C∗(t) = l0θ(t) (2.9)
and
xi∗(t) =
1
n
l0γ(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (2.10)
with
λ =
1
nα
A1−αlα+β−10 .
We then move on to study the public good contribution game (cf. Section 4 below). We are
able to characterize the unique equilibrium with the help of suitable first order conditions. In
the specific Cobb–Douglas case with Le´vy stochastics, we solve explicitly the symmetric variant
of the game.
Proposition 2.3. Take ui(x, c) = x
αcβ
α+β , i = 1, . . . , n, for some α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that α+β < 1,
and ψx(t) = e
−rtEx(t), ψc(t) = e−rtEc(t), for some exponential Le´vy processes Ec and Ex. Define
the processes
γ(t) :=
1
A
[(α+ β
α
)
Ex(t) inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
, (2.11)
θ(t) := sup
0≤s≤t
(
E−
1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)
)
, (2.12)
1The martingale property of Assumption 1 is without loss of generality in this case, one just has to correct r
by the Le´vy exponents of Ex and Ec, respectively. In any case, the martingale property of Ex and Ec is not needed
in the proof of the following results.
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and the constants
κ :=
w
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
1
n
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
] (2.13)
and
A := E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E−
α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du
]
(2.14)
with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
.
Then, if κ and A are finite, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of game (4.1) is given by
Cˆi(t) =
κ
n
θ(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (2.15)
xˆi(t) = κγ(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (2.16)
with
λi = A1−ακα+β−1, i = 1, . . . , n.
The results of Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 above allows us to explicitly evaluate the free-rider
effect (see Section 4.1 below).
Proposition 2.4. Let C∗ be the optimal aggregated public good contribution for the social
planner problem (cf. (2.9)) and let Cˆ denote its Nash-equilibrium value (cf. (2.15)). Assume
ψc(t) = e
−rt and ψx(t) = e−rtEx(t) ≡ e−rt+σW (t), σ > 0, for a one-dimensional Brownian
motion W and for some r such that
√
2r > σα1−α−β . Then, for any n ≥ 1 one has
C∗(t)
Cˆ(t)
=
κ
l0
=
α+ β
nα+ β
≤ 1, (2.17)
where κ and l0 are as in (2.13) and (2.7), respectively.
We observe that the ratio C∗/Cˆ, the underprovision of the public good due to free-riding,
does not depend on σ, the volatility of the Brownian motion W . Thus, in our model
Corollary 2.5. The degree of free-riding does not depend on the level of uncertainty.
This seems to be in contrast to the idea that uncertainty might have some effect on the free
rider effect (cf. Austen-Smith [2], Eichberger and Kelsey [23] and Wang [51], among others).
Moreover, we show that also irreversibility of public good provisions do not have any effect on
free-riding. These two results represent the main economically interesting conclusions of our
paper.
Finally, under the reasonable and common assumption that the private good is square-
integrable, we also provide an abstract existence result for a Nash equilibrium (cf. Section 4.2).
Theorem 2.6. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 (see Section 4.2 below), there exists a Nash equi-
librium (xˆi, Cˆi)i∈{1,...,n} ∈
∏n
i=1 Bwi for the game:
U i(xˆi, Cˆi; Cˆ−i) ≥ U i(xi, Ci; Cˆ−i) for all (xi, Ci) ∈ Bwi , xi ∈ L2(dµx),
i = 1, . . . , n.
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3 The Social Planner Problem
We start our analysis by studying a social planner problem for the economy described in Section
2. Throughout this section, denote by (x,C) a vector with components (x1, . . . , xn, C1, . . . , Cn)
and introduce the nonempty, convex set
Bw :=
{
(x,C) : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R2n+ adapted s.t. Ci is right-continuous, nondecreasing,
Ci(0−) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n, P-a.s. and
n∑
i=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
≤ w
}
with w :=
∑n
i=1w
i. We say that (x,C) is admissible if (x,C) ∈ Bw. Suppose that there
exists a fictitious social planner aiming to maximize the aggregate expected utility by allocating
efficiently the available wealth. In mathematical terms, this amounts to solving the optimization
problem with value function
VSP := sup
(x,C)∈Bw
USP (x,C) = sup
(x,C)∈Bw
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xi, Ci;C−i) (3.1)
with U i(xi, Ci;C−i) as in (2.2) and for positive weights γi, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
∑n
i=1 γ
i = 1.
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption 1 there exists a unique (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw that solves the social
planner’s problem (3.1).
Proof. Recall that ψx(t) = e
αx(t)Ex(t) and ψc(t) = eαc(t)Ec(t), for some continuous and bounded
processes αx and αc, and for some exponential martingales Ex and Ec (cf. Assumption 1.ii.).
Let E˜c[·] and E˜x[·] be the expectations under the measures P˜c and P˜x with Radon-Nikodym
derivative Ec(T ) and Ex(T ), respectively, with respect to P. Since Ex(T ) > 0 and Ec(T ) > 0 a.s.,
the measure P is equivalent to P˜c and P˜x. Denote by V the space of all optional random measures
on [0, T ] endowed with the weak-topology in the probabilistic sense, by L1(dµx) the space of all
functions integrable with respect to the measure dµx := dP˜x ⊗ dt and set x(t) :=
∑n
i=1 x
i(t).
Then Bw ⊂ L1(dµx)n ⊗ Vn. Indeed, for any i = 1, . . . , n, and for some constant K1 > 0
w ≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
eαx(t)E[Ex(T )|Ft]xi(t)dt
]
= E
[
Ex(T )
∫ T
0
eαx(t)xi(t)dt
]
≥ K1E˜x
[ ∫ T
0
xi(t)dt
]
, (3.2)
where Girsanov’s Theorem implies the last step. Also, each component of C is the cumulative
distribution of an optional random measure; i.e., it is an adapted, nondecreasing process with
right-continuous paths.
Let now {(xm, Cm)}m∈N ⊂ Bw be a maximizing sequence; that is, a sequence such that
lim
m→∞
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xim, C
i
m;C
−i
m ) = VSP .
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The two sequences {E˜x[
∫ T
0 x
i
m(t)dt]}m∈N and {E˜c[Cim(T )]}m∈N are uniformly bounded in m for
every i = 1, . . . , n, because of (3.2) and since, analogously,
w ≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
eαc(t)E[Ec(T )|Ft] dCi(t)
]
= E
[
Ec(T )
∫ T
0
eαc(t)dCi(t)
]
= E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
eαc(t)dCi(t)
]
≥ K2E˜c[Ci(T )],
where the second equality follows from [30], Theorem 1.33, and with K2 > 0 a suitable constant.
Hence by Komlo`s’ theorem (see Komlo`s [34] and Kabanov [32], Lemma 3.5, for a version of
Komlo`s’ theorem for optional random measures), for every i = 1, . . . , n there exist two subse-
quences {x˜im}m∈N ⊂ {xim}m∈N and {C˜im}m∈N ⊂ {Cim}m∈N such that
Xik(t) :=
1
k + 1
k∑
m=0
x˜im → xi∗(t), dµx-a.e. (3.3)
and
Iik(t) :=
1
k + 1
k∑
m=0
C˜im → Ci∗(t), P˜c-a.s., for every point of continuity of Ci∗(·) and t = T
(3.4)
as k → ∞ for some B([0, T ]) ⊗ FT -measurable process xi∗ and for some Ci∗ ∈ V, i = 1, . . . , n.
From now on we will denote by Ci∗ the right-continuous modification of Ci∗. Notice that having
limk→∞ Iik(t) = C
i∗(t) P˜c-a.s. for every point of continuity of Ci∗(·) and for t = T means that the
sequence of optional random measures on [0, T ] dIik(·) converges weakly a.s. to dCi∗(·); that is,
lim
k→∞
∫ T
0
f(t)dIik(t) =
∫ T
0
f(t)dCi∗(t), P˜c − a.s., (3.5)
for every continuous and bounded function f(·) (see, e.g., Billingsley [15]). We now claim that
the Komlo`s’ limit (x∗, C∗) := (x1∗, . . . , xn∗ , C1∗ , . . . , Cn∗ ) belongs to Bw and that it is optimal for the
social planner’s problem (3.1). Indeed, (Xk, Ik) := (X
1
k , . . . , X
n
k , I
1
k , . . . , I
n
k ) ∈ Bw by convexity
of Bw, and (3.3), (3.5) and Fatou’s Lemma imply
w ≥ lim inf
k→∞
n∑
i=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)X
i
k(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dI
i
k(t)
]
= lim inf
k→∞
n∑
i=1
(
E˜x
[ ∫ T
0
eαx(t)Xik(t)dt
]
+ E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
eαc(t)dIik(t)
])
=
n∑
i=1
E˜x
[ ∫ T
0
eαx(t)xi∗(t)dt
]
+ E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
eαc(t)dCi∗(t)
]
=
n∑
i=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i
∗(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i
∗(t)
]
;
Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution 10
that is, (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw. Recall now that Px ∼ P and Pc ∼ P. Then (3.4) and (3.3) also hold
P-a.s. and dP⊗ dt-a.e., respectively, and therefore we may write
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xi∗, C
i
∗;C
−i
∗ ) = lim
k→∞
n∑
i=1
γiU i(Xik, I
i
k; I
−i
k ) = VSP
by the uniform integrability assumed in Assumption 1.v. and because (Xk, Ik) is a maximizing
sequence by concavity of each U i. Hence (x∗, C∗) is optimal.
Finally, uniqueness of (x∗, C∗) follows as usual from strict concavity of the utility functions
ui, i = 1, . . . , n and from convexity of Bw.
Remark 3.2. Notice that all the arguments employed in the proof of Theorem 3.1 still work in
the infinite-horizon case T = +∞, under the further assumption that Ex and Ec are P-uniformly
integrable martingales.
We now aim to characterize the social planner’s optimal policy by means of a set of first order
conditions for optimality. This approach has been used in various instances to solve singular
stochastic control problems of the monotone follower type (see Bank [6], Bank and Riedel [10],
Chiarolla, Ferrari and Riedel [17], Riedel and Su [45] and Steg [49], among others), and it may
be thought of as a stochastic, infinite dimensional generalization of the classical Kuhn-Tucker
method. In the previous papers the optimal policy is constructed as the running supremum of
a desirable value. Such level of satisfaction is the optional solution of a stochastic backward
equation in the spirit of Bank-El Karoui (cf. Bank and El Karoui [7], Theorem 3) and it may be
represented in terms of the value functions of a family of standard optimal stopping problems.
For any (x,C) ∈ Bw define the Lagrangian functional of problem (3.1) as
Lw(x,C;λ) :=
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xi, Ci;C−i) + λ
{
w −
n∑
i=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]}
=
n∑
i=1
γiE
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsui(xi(t), C(t)) dt
]
+ λ
{
w −E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC(t)
]}
for some Lagrange multiplier λ > 0, and where again x(t) :=
∑n
i=1 x
i(t) and C(t) :=
∑n
i=1C
i(t).
Moreover, let T be the set of all Ft-stopping times with values in [0, T ] a.s. and denote by ∇cLw
the Lagrangian functional’s supergradient with respect the aggregated public good; that is, the
unique optional process given by
∇cLw(x,C;λ)(τ) := E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γi uic(x
i(t), C(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ]− λψc(τ)1{τ<T}
for any τ ∈ T .
On the other hand, an additional consumption of the private good xi affects marginal utility
only at those times at which consumption actually occurs. It means that
∇xLw(x,C;λ)(τ) := γie−
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsuix(x
i(τ), C(τ))− λψx(τ), τ ∈ T .
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Remark 3.3. Following Bank and Riedel [10], the quantity ∇cLw(x,C;λ)(t) may be inter-
preted as the marginal expected profit resulting from an additional infinitesimal investment at
time t when the investment plan is (x,C) and the Lagrange multiplier is λ. Mathematically,
∇cLw(x,C;λ) is the Riesz representation of the Lagrangian gradient at C. More precisely, for
any arbitrary but fixed λ > 0, define ∇cLw(x,C;λ) as the optional projection of the product-
measurable process
Φ(ω, t) :=
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γi uic(x
i(s), C(s)) ds− λψc(t)1{t<T}
for ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence ∇cLw(x,C;λ) is uniquely determined up to P-indistinguishability
and it holds
E
{ ∫
[0,T )
∇cLw(x,C;λ)dC(t)
}
= E
{ ∫
[0,T )
Φ(t)dC(t)
}
for all admissible C (cf. Jacod [30], Theorem 1.33).
Proposition 3.4. Let Assumption 1 hold. An admissible policy (x∗, C∗) is optimal for the
social planner’s problem (3.1) if and only if there exists a Lagrange multiplier λ > 0 such that
the following first order conditions hold true for any stopping time ∈ T
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x∗(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC∗(t)
]
= w,
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ λψc(τ)1{τ<T}, P− a.s.,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(s), C∗(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]− λψc(t))dC∗(t)] = 0,
γie−
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsuix(x
i
∗(τ), C∗(τ)) ≤ λψx(τ), P− a.s. with equality whenever xi∗(τ) > 0.
(3.6)
The proof of Proposition 3.4 is given in Appendix A, Section A.1. It generalizes that of Bank
and Riedel [10], Theorem 3.2, to the present setting of a multidimensional optimal consumption
problem (with both classical absolutely continuous and monotone controls) and it resembles
the arguments employed to prove optimality of the classical Kuhn-Tucker conditions of real
analysis. Indeed, concavity of the utility functions ui, i = 1, . . . , n yields sufficiency, whereas
the proof of the necessity part is a bit more delicate. One has indeed to linearize the original
problem (3.1) around its optimal solution (x∗, C∗) and then to show that (x∗, C∗) solves the
linearized problem as well. Finally, one must prove that any solution to the linearized problem
(and therefore (x∗, C∗) as well) satisfies some flat-off conditions similar to the third and the
fourth ones of (3.6).
Notice that because of the Inada conditions (cf. Assumption 1.iii.) the fourth one of (3.6) is
binding at any τ ∈ T , i.e.
γie−
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsuix(x
i
∗(τ), C∗(τ)) = λψx(τ).
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Recalling that (x, c) 7→ ui(x, c) is strictly concave, and denoting by gi(·, c) the inverse of uix(·, c),
we may write
xi∗(τ) = g
i
( λ
γi
e
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsψx(τ), C∗(τ)
)
, τ ∈ T . (3.7)
Then, by plugging (3.7) into (3.6) we obtain the equivalent formulation
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x∗(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC∗(t)
]
= w,
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), C∗(t)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ λψc(τ)1{τ<T}, P− a.s.,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ s
0 r(u)duψx(s), C∗(s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]− λψc(t))dC∗(t)] = 0,
e−
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(τ), C∗(τ)) = λψx(τ), P− a.s.,
(3.8)
for any τ ∈ T and with hi(ψ, c) := uic(gi(ψ, c), c).
Although the first order conditions of Proposition 3.4 (or those in (3.8)) completely char-
acterize the optimal policy, they are not binding at all times and so they cannot be directly
used to determine C∗ and consequently x∗ by (3.7). As usual in the literature on monotone
follower problems (see, e.g., Chiarolla and Ferrari [16], Chiarolla and Haussmann [18] and [19],
El Karoui and Karatzas [24], Karatzas and Shreve [33] or Riedel and Su [45]), the optimal policy
consists of keeping the controlled process close to some barrier (which is the free boundary of
the associated optimal stopping problem in a Markovian setting, cf. Ferrari [25]) in a ‘minimal
way’. Here we derive the social planner’s optimal investment into the public good C∗ in terms of
the running supremum of the unique optional solution l∗ to the backward stochastic equation2
presented in our Theorem 2.1 in Section 2, which naturally arises from the first order conditions
(3.8).
We can now provide the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Existence of a unique optional, upper right-continuous solution l∗ to
(2.4) is shown in Appendix A, Proposition A.2. To show optimality of (x∗(t), C∗(t)) as in
(2.3) it suffices to verify that it is admissible and it satisfies the sufficient and necessary first
order conditions (3.8). C∗ as in (2.3) is adapted with right-continuous sample paths, since l∗ is
optional and upper right-continuous, and xi∗, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, is adapted and positive, since gi is
continuous and positive. Moreover, for any τ ∈ T we have
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), ( sup
0≤u≤t
l∗(u)) ∨ 0
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), sup
τ≤u≤t
l∗(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λψc(τ)1{τ<T}, (3.9)
2Cf. Bank and El Karoui [7], Theorem 1 and Theorem 3.
Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution 13
where the first inequality follows from the fact that c 7→ hi(ψ, c) is strictly decreasing, whereas
(2.4) implies the last equality. On the other hand, if τ ∈ T is a time of investment, i.e. such that
dC∗(τ) > 0, we have (sup0≤u≤t l∗(u))∨0 = supτ≤u≤t l∗(u) and equality holds in (3.9). Therefore
the second line of (3.8) is satisfied as well. The optimal private good consumption xi∗ of (2.3) is
then determined by means of (3.7).
The process l∗ may be found numerically by backward induction on a discretized version of
problem (2.4) (see Bank and Fo¨llmer [8], Section 4). In some cases, when T = +∞, (2.4) has a
closed form solution as in the case of a Cobb-Douglas utility function (see Section 3.1 below).
3.1 Explicit Results for a Symmetric Economy with Cobb-Douglas Utility
In this section we aim to explicitly solve the social planner’s problem in the symmetric case,
that is when all the agents have the same utility function. To do so, also suppose that T = +∞,
r(t) = r a.s. for all t ≥ 0 and wi = w for all i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, we may assume that
the social planner does not prefer any agent more than any other; that is, γi = 1n for every
i = 1, . . . , n.
The explicit solution has been presented in Proposition 2.2 in Section 2.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Recall that hi(ψ, c) = uic(g
i(ψ, c), c), where gi(·, c) is the inverse of
uix(·, c). For any λ > 0, simple algebra leads to hi( λγi ertψx(t), C(t)) = δ(nλEx(t))
α
α−1C
α+β−1
1−α (t)
with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
. Set C∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t l∗(s)∨0 for some progressively measurable process
l∗(t) to be found and then (2.4) becomes
E
[ ∫ ∞
τ
δe−rs(nλEx(s))
α
α−1
(
sup
τ≤u≤s
l∗(u)
)α+β−1
1−α
ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λe−rτEc(τ),
i.e.,
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru(nλ)
α
α−1
Ex
α
α−1 (u+ τ)
Ec(τ) inf0≤s≤u
(
l∗
α+β−1
1−α (s+ τ)
)
du
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λ. (3.10)
Make now the ansatz l∗(t) := l0Ec
1−α
α+β−1 (t)Ex
α
α+β−1 (t) for some constant l0, and use independence
and stationarity of Le´vy increments to rewrite (3.10) as
1
n
α
1−α
l
α+β−1
1−α
0 E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E
α
α−1
x (u− s)
)
du
]
= λ
1
1−α .
By setting A := E[
∫∞
0 δe
−ru inf0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E−
α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du] (cf. (2.8)) and by solving the
previous equation for λ one easily obtains
λ :=
1
nα
A1−αlα+β−10 .
On the other hand, xi∗(t) = [nλ
(
α+β
α
)
Ex(t)C−β∗ (t)]
1
α−1 by (3.7) and therefore
xi∗(t) =
1
A
(nλ)−
1
1−α
[(
α+ β
α
)
Ex(t)l−β0 inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
;
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that is,
xi∗(t) =
1
n
l0γ(t) (3.11)
with γ(t) as in (2.5).
To determine l0 we make use of the budget constraint E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)x∗(t)dt+
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dC∗(t)] =
nw. In fact, recalling that x∗(t) :=
∑n
i=1 x
i∗(t), from (3.11) we find
l0E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
= nw, (3.12)
since C∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t l∗(s) = l0 sup0≤s≤t(E
− 1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)) = l0θ(t) with θ(t) as in (2.6).
By solving (3.12) for l0 (2.7) follows. Notice that l0 of (2.7) and A of (2.8) are finite under some
further specifications of the model as it is shown in the proof of Proposition 2.4 in Section 4.1
below.
Remark 3.5. As usual in monotone follower problems, the optimal aggregated public good level
C∗(t) (cf. (2.5) and (2.9)) is a singular process since it increases only on a set of zero Lebesgue
measure. Moreover, the ratio x
i∗(t)
w is independent of n, since
xi∗(t)
w = γ(t)(E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)γ(t)dt +∫∞
0 ψc(t)dθ(t)])
−1, whereas C∗(t) ∼ n and λ ∼ n−(1−β). That is a typical behaviour for a
Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Corollary 3.6. Assume Ex(t) = Ec(t) = eσW (t) =: E(t), σ > 0, for a one-dimensional Brownian
motion W and take
√
2r > σ(α+β)1−α−β . Then one has
VSP = Ξ
[
1√
2r + σα1−α
] 1√
2r − σ(α+β)1−α−β
 ,
where
Ξ :=
2
Aα
lα+β0
(α+ β)nα
(
α+ β
α
)− α
1−α
. (3.13)
Proof. If Ex(t) = Ec(t) ≡ E(t) := eσW (t), by Proposition (2.2) (cf. (2.9) and (2.10)) straightfor-
ward calculations lead to
(xi∗)
α(t) =
1
Aα
lα0
nα
(
α+ β
α
)− α
1−α
E− α1−α (t)
(
sup
0≤s≤t
E− β1−α−β (s)
) α
1−α
and
Cβ∗ (t) = l
β
0 sup
0≤s≤t
E− β1−α−β (s)
with l0 and A as in (2.7) and (2.8), respectively. Notice that A and l0 are both finite since
A ≤ δE[∫∞0 e−ru− σα1−αW (u)du] = ∫∞0 e−[r− 12 ( σα1−α )2]udu < ∞ (for √2r > σ(α+β)1−α−β ), and l0 ≤
nw(E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)γ(t)dt])
−1 ≤ nwβα−1 <∞.
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Recall (2.2) and (3.1). Then, with Ξ as in (3.13), it follows that
VSP :=
n∑
i=1
γi
1
α+ β
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rt(xi∗)
α(t)Cβ∗ (t)dt
]
=
Ξ
r
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rtE− α1−α (t) sup
0≤s≤t
(
E−
β
(1−α)(1−α−β) (s)
)
dt
]
=
Ξ
r
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rte−
σα
1−αW (t) e
− σβ
(1−α)(1−α−β) inf0≤u≤tW (u)dt
]
=
Ξ
r
E
[
e−
σα
1−αW (τr) e
− σβ
(1−α)(1−α−β) inf0≤u≤τr W (u)
]
, (3.14)
where τr is an independent exponentially distributed random time with parameter r. Now,
by using the Excursion Theory for Le´vy processes (cf. Bertoin [14]), W (t) − sup0≤u≤tW (u) is
independent of sup0≤u≤tW (u), and by the Duality Theorem, W (t) − sup0≤u≤tW (u) has the
same distribution as inf0≤u≤tW (u). Hence, we may write from (3.14)
VSP :=
Ξ
r
E
[
e−
σα
1−αW (τr) e
− σβ
(1−α)(1−α−β) inf0≤u≤τr W (u)
]
=
Ξ
r
E
[
e
σα
1−α [−W (τr)−sup0≤u≤τr (−W (u))] e[
σα
1−α+
σβ
(1−α)(1−α−β) ] sup0≤u≤τr (−W (u))
]
=
Ξ
r
E
[
e
σα
1−α inf0≤u≤τr (−W (u))
]
E
[
e
σ(α+β)
1−α−β sup0≤u≤τr (−W (u))
]
,
=
Ξ
r
E
[
e−
σα
1−α sup0≤u≤τr W (u)
]
E
[
e
σ(α+β)
1−α−β sup0≤u≤τr (−W (u))
]
,
=
Ξ
r
[ √
2r√
2r + σα1−α
][ √
2r√
2r − σ(α+β)1−α−β
]
,
where the last equality follows from the fact that sup0≤u≤τr W (u) ∼ sup0≤u≤τr(−W (u)) ∼
Exp(
√
2r) (see, e.g., Bertoin [14], Chapter VII).
4 The Public Good Contribution Game
In Section 3 we have taken the point of view of a fictitious social planner aiming to efficiently
maximize the social welfare. Here we aim to study strategic interaction between the agents
of our economy. We shall see that our model exhibits a dynamic free rider effect (cf. Varian
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[50], among others) that we will analyze in detail in Section 4.1 below. Determining agent i’s
optimal choice of a strategy against a given process C−i specifying aggregate contributions by
the opponents amounts to solving the stochastic control problem with value function
V i(C−i) := sup
(xi,Ci)∈Bwi
U i(xi, Ci;C−i), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (4.1)
where Bwi and U i are as in (2.1) and (2.2), respectively. The description of the game is completed
by the introduction of a standard Nash equilibrium concept.
Definition 4.1. (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn, Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (xˆi, Cˆi) ∈
Bwi and U i(xˆi, Cˆi, Cˆ−i) = V i(Cˆ−i).
While this equilibrium notion does not limit the ability of any agent to optimize against
given strategies of the others, it does limit the extent of dynamic interaction that can take
place. Although agents do react to the evolving exogenous uncertainty, they take the contribu-
tion processes of others as given and do not react to deviations from announced (equilibrium)
play. Therefore, one might term such an equilibrium as one in precommitment strategies. Un-
fortunately there are serious conceptual difficulties in defining a related game with more explicit
feedback strategies as argued by Back and Paulsen [3], which is why we consider simple Nash
equilibria here.
As in the social planner’s case we shall first characterize solutions of the best reply problems
(4.1) by means of a stochastic Kuhn-Tucker approach. The next Proposition accomplishes this.
Its proof may be obtained by adopting arguments similar to those employed to prove Proposition
3.4.
Proposition 4.2. Let Cˆ−i be given and Assumption 1 hold. Then (xˆi, Cˆi) ∈ Bwi attains V i(Cˆ−i)
(cf. (4.1)) if and only if there exists a Lagrange multiplier λi > 0 such that for any stopping
time τ ∈ T the following first order conditions hold true
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCˆ
i(t)
]
= wi,
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsuic(xˆ
i(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ λiψc(τ), P− a.s.,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) duuic(xˆ
i(s), Cˆ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]− λiψc(t))dCˆi(t)] = 0,
e−
∫ τ
0 r(u) duuix(xˆ
i(τ), Cˆ(τ)) ≤ λiψx(τ), P− a.s. with equality whenever xˆi(τ) > 0.
(4.2)
The Inada conditions (cf. Assumption 1.iii.) imply that the fourth one of (4.2) is always
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binding. Hence, we may equivalently rewrite (4.2) as
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCˆ
i(t)
]
= wi,
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dshi(λie
∫ t
0 r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ λiψc(τ), P− a.s.,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) duhi(λie
∫ s
0 r(u) duψx(s), Cˆ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]− λiψc(t))dCˆi(t)] = 0,
e−
∫ τ
0 r(u) duuix(xˆ
i(τ), Cˆ(τ)) = λiψx(τ), P− a.s.,
where again hi(ψ, c) := uic(g
i(ψ, c), c) with gi(·, c) the inverse of uix(·, c).
As in Section 3.1, we can use the first order conditions to explicitly solve the best reply
problems (4.1) in the symmetric case, i.e. in the case that all the agents have the same utility
function. To do so we also need to assume that T = +∞, r(t) = r a.s. for all t ≥ 0 and wi = w
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Then we obtain the explicit Nash equilibrium presented in Proposition 2.3
in Section 2. The proof, employing arguments similar to those used for the proof of Proposition
(2.2), is given in Appendix A, Section A.3, for the sake of completeness.
4.1 The Free Rider Effect
In this section we shall assume the same symmetric setting of Section 3.1 to study the so called
free-rider effect.
Let xi∗ be the optimal private consumption in the social planner’s problem (cf. (2.10)), and
let xˆi denote the Nash equilibrium private consumption (cf. (2.16)). Then one has
xi∗(t) =
wγ(t)
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
≤ wγ(t)
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
1
n
∫
[0,∞)
ψc(t)dθ(t)
] = xˆi(t),
with equality for n = 1. It follows that in a strategic context each agent spends more for the
private consumption than what would be suggested by the social planner. On the other hand,
we have κ ≤ l0 (with κ as in (2.13), l0 as in (2.7) and equality if n = 1) which implies that the
social planner’s optimal cumulative contribution into the public good (2.9) is bigger than the
corresponding Nash equilibrium counterpart (2.15). That is, our model shows a dynamic free
rider effect.
The evaluation of the free rider effect can be made even more explicit in a Black-Scholes
setting and with the public good taken as a nume´raire. The result is stated in Proposition 2.4
of Section 2 and we can now present the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4. From (2.9) and (2.15) it easily follows that
C∗(t)
Cˆ(t)
=
κ
l0
=
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdθ(t)
]
E
[
n
∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdθ(t)
]
=
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtθ(t)dt
]
E
[
n
∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtθ(t)dt
] , (4.3)
with γ(t) and θ(t) as in (2.11) and (2.12), respectively. Then, in order to obtain (2.17), we need
to evaluate
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt
]
and E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rtθ(t)dt
]
.
We have
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rtθ(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rt sup
0≤s≤t
E−
α
1−α−β
x (s) dt
]
=E
[
e
− σα
1−α−β inf0≤s≤τr W (s)
]
= E
[
e
σα
1−α−β sup0≤s≤τr (−W (s))
]
=
√
2r√
2r − σα1−α−β
, (4.4)
where τr is an independent exponentially distributed random time and where the last equality
follows from sup0≤s≤τr(−W (s)) ∼ Exp(
√
2r) (cf., e.g., Bertoin [14], Chapter VII). On the other
hand, recall γ as in (2.11) and exploit the fact from Excursion Theory for Le´vy processes that
W (t) − sup0≤u≤tW (u) is independent of sup0≤u≤tW (u) and the Duality Theorem saying that
W (t)− sup0≤u≤tW (u) has the same distribution as inf0≤u≤tW (u) to find
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rte−
σα
1−αW (t)e
− σαβ
(1−α)(1−α−β) inf0≤u≤tW (u)dt
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e
σα
1−α (−W (τr))e
σαβ
(1−α)(1−α−β) sup0≤u≤τr (−W (u))
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e
σα
1−α [W˜ (τr))−sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)]e
σα
1−α−β sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
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=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e
σα
1−α inf0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
E
[
e
σα
1−α−β sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e−
σα
1−α sup0≤u≤τr W (u)
]
E
[
e
σα
1−α−β sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
[ √
2r√
2r + σα1−α
][ √
2r√
2r − σα1−α−β
]
,
where we have defined the Brownian motion W˜ := −W and where we have used once more
sup0≤s≤τr W (s) ∼ sup0≤s≤τr W˜ (s) ∼ Exp(
√
2r). Again, if τr is an independent exponentially
distributed random time one has
A = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δ e−rt inf
0≤s≤t
E−
α
1−α
x (t− s) dt
]
=
δ
r
E
[
e−
σα
1−α sup0≤s≤τr W (τr−s)
]
=
δ
r
E
[
e−
σα
1−α sup0≤s′≤τr W (s
′)
]
=
δ
r
[ √
2r√
2r + σα1−α
]
with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
)− 1
1−α
as sup0≤s≤τr(−W (s)) ∼ Exp(
√
2r). Therefore
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt
]
=
α
β
[ √
2r√
2r − σα1−α−β
]
. (4.5)
Finally, by plugging (4.4) and (4.5) into (4.3), some simple algebra leads to (2.17).
It follows from (2.17) that free-riding is not influenced by the uncertain status of the economy
in the sense that the ratio C∗/Cˆ does not depend on σ, the volatility of the Brownian motion
W . In contrast to the idea that uncertainty might have some effect on the free rider effect (cf.
Austen-Smith [2], Eichberger and Kelsey [23] and Wang [51], among others) in our model we
can conlude that
Corollary 4.3. The degree of free-riding does not depend on the level of uncertainty.
We now evaluate the role that irreversibility of the public good contribution has in the free
rider effect. To do so we compare the ratio (2.17) with the analogous one we shall obtain
by assuming instead perfect reversibility of C; i.e., by assuming that each agent can adjust
contribution in the public good freely at every point of time.
Proposition 4.4. Assume perfect reversibility of the public good contribution. Denote by C?
the optimal aggregated public good contribution made by the social planner and by C˜ its Nash
equilibrium value. Then, under the same hypotheses of Proposition (2.4), one has
C?(t)
C˜(t)
=
α+ β
nα+ β
(4.6)
for any n ≥ 1.
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Proof. We only sketch the proof. Under perfect reversibility of the public good contribution,
the optimal investment criterion is to equate the marginal operating profit with the user cost of
capital (see, e.g., Jorgensen [31]). Hence the first-order conditions for optimality in the social
planner’s problem read
α
α+ β
(xi?)
α−1(t)Cβ? (t) = λ?nEx(t),
β
α+ β
(xi?)
α(t)Cβ−1? (t) = λ?r,
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)
n∑
i=1
xi?(t) dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtC?(t) dt
]
= nw,
(4.7)
whereas for the Nash equilibrium they are
α
α+ β
(x˜i)α−1(t)C˜β(t) = λ˜Ex(t),
β
α+ β
(x˜i)α(t)C˜β−1(t) = λ˜r,
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)x˜
i(t) dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
1
n
C˜(t) dt
]
= w.
(4.8)
By solving systems (4.7) and (4.8) one easily obtains
xi?(t) =
(
rα
β
)[
λ?
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β
(nEx(t))−
(1−β)
1−α−β ,
C?(t) =
[
λ?
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β
(nEx(t))−
α
1−α−β ,
λ
− 1
1−α−β
? =
nw
rn
− α
1−α−β
(
α+β
β
) [(
rα
β
)1−α (
α+β
α
) ]− 1
1−α−β
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α−β
x (t) dt
] ,
and
x˜i(t) =
(
rα
β
)[
λ?
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β E−
(1−β)
1−α−β
x (t),
C˜(t) =
[
λ?
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β E−
α
1−α−β
x (t),
λ˜
− 1
1−α−β =
nw
rn
− α
1−α−β
(
nα+β
nβ
) [(
rα
β
)1−α (
α+β
α
)− 1
1−α−β
]− 1
1−α−β
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α−β
x (t) dt
] ,
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with E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α−β
x (t) dt
]
<∞ since √2r > α1−α−β . Then (4.6) follows.
Corollary 4.5. For any n ≥ 1 one has
C∗(t)
Cˆ(t)
=
C?(t)
C˜(t)
≤ 1.
That is, irreversibility of the public good contributions does not influence the degree of free-riding.
In conclusion, we have shown that in our model, for a symmetric economy with Cobb-Douglas
utilities, the degree of underprovision of the public good due to free-riding does not depend on
irreversibility of the public good contributions or the level of uncertainty, when the latter is
given by an exogenous one-dimensional Brownian motion.
4.2 An Existence Result for Nash Equilibria
We conclude the analysis of the game by proving an abstract existence result for a Nash equilib-
rium (cf. Definition 4.1). To do so we will combine arguments from Conjugate Duality Theory
(cf. Rockafellar [46]) and from the General Theory of Stochastic Processes (cf. Dellacherie and
Meyer [21]) to apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem.
Recall that ψx(t) = e
αx(t)Ex(t) and ψc(t) = eαc(t)Ec(t) for some continuous and bounded
processes αx and αc, and for some exponential martingales Ex and Ec (cf. Assumption 1.ii.).
Moreover, as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, let E˜c[·] and E˜x[·] denote the expectations under
the measures P˜c and P˜x with Radon-Nikodym derivative Ec(T ) and Ex(T ), respectively, with
respect to P. Since Ex(T ) > 0 and Ec(T ) > 0 a.s., the measure P is equivalent to P˜c and P˜x.
Finally, define L2(dµx) as the space of all functions square-integrable with respect to the product
measure dµx := dP˜x ⊗ dt. From now on we make the following
Assumption 2. xi ∈ L2(dµx), for any i = 1, . . . , n.
Since ψx is a discounted martingale, an application of Girsanov’s Theorem shows that Assump-
tion 2 means that E[
∫ T
0 ψx(t)|xi(t)|2dt] <∞ for any i = 1, . . . , n; that is, (xi)2 has a finite price.
Such a condition is quite common in financial models where one usually takes the commodity
space to be L2 (on some measure space) and the consumption set to be the positive cone L2+
(see Duffie and Zame [22] or Hildenbrand and Sonnenschein [29], Chapter 34, among others).
Taking account of the additional constraint, we define the new set of admissible strategies
for agent i = 1, . . . , n and arbitrary but fixed wi ∈ R+ by
Awi :=
{
(xi, Ci) : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R2+ adapted s.t. C is right-continuous, nondecreasing,
Ci(0−) = 0 P-a.s., E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
≤ wi and
E˜x
[ ∫ T
0
|xi(t)|2dt
]
<∞
}
.
Notice that Awi ⊆ Swi ⊗Kwi , with
Swi:=
{
Ci : (0, Ci) ∈ Awi
}
, Kwi :=
{
xi : (xi, 0) ∈ Awi
}
.
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It is convenient to rewrite the maximal sets of contribution to the public good or of private
consumption, respectively, under the measures P˜c and P˜x; that is
Swi :=
{
Ci : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R+ adapted s.t. C is right-continuous, nondecreasing,
Ci(0−) = 0 P˜c-a.s. and E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
eαc(t)dCi(t)
]
≤ wi
}
,
(4.9)
and
Kwi :=
{
xi : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R+ adapted s.t. E˜x
[ ∫ T
0
eαx(t)xi(t)dt
]
≤ wi and
E˜x
[ ∫ T
0
|xi(t)|2dt
]
<∞
}
.
(4.10)
Proving existence of a Nash equilibrium with payoffs
V i(C−i) := sup
(xi,Ci)∈Awi
U i(xi, Ci;C−i), i = 1, . . . , n,
and U i as in (2.2) usually amounts to applying some fixed point argument, and hence to proving
compactness of the set of admissible strategies and continuity (or even upper semicontinuity) of
the payoff functionals. By employing a duality approach, we start proving compactness of Kwi
and Swi (cf. (4.9) and (4.10)) in some suitable topologies and closedness of Awi with respect to
the associated product topology. From now on let i = 1, . . . , n be arbitrary but fixed.
Proposition 4.6. The set Kwi is a compact subset of L2(dµx) with respect to the weak-topology
σ(L2(dµx),L2(dµx)).
Proof. The set Kwi is the polar of the singleton
{eαx
wi
}
⊂ L2(dµx). Hence, the Banach-Alaoglu
Theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border [1]) implies the thesis.
To take care of Swi we may adopt arguments by Martins-da-Rocha and Riedel [38] and [39].
Let M+ be the set of all positive, nondecreasing and ca`dla`g functions from [0, T ] into R+. The
set of (P˜c-equivalent classes of) mappings C : Ω 7→ M+ such that C(t) is Ft-adapted for any
t ∈ [0, T ] and C(T ) ∈ L1(P˜c) is denoted by E+. The linear span of E+ is E. It follows that any
C ∈ E+ may be identified with an optional random measure on [0, T ] that we denote by dC.
Moreover, if Z ∈ E, then there exist C1, C2 ∈ E+ such that Z = C1 − C2. We endow E with
the total variation norm
||Z||E := E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
d|Z|(t)
]
, Z ∈ E. (4.11)
Let B(T ) denote the space of bounded functions on [0, T ] and L∞(P˜c, B(T )) the space (up
to indistinguishability) of all progressively measurable processes ψ : Ω × [0, T ] 7→ R such that
ω 7→ supt∈[0,T ] ψ(ω, t) ∈ L∞(P˜c).
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A natural duality 〈·, ·〉 on L∞(P˜c, B(T ))× E is
〈ψ,Z〉 := E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
ψ(t)dZ(t)
]
and we denote by F the space of bounded processes ψ ∈ L∞(P˜c, B(T )) that are optional, i.e.
measurable with respect to the optional sigma-field O generated, for example, by all the ca`dla`g
processes (see Dellacherie and Meyer [21], among others). On the other hand, F+ is the order
dual cone
F+ := {ψ ∈ F : 〈ψ,C〉 ≥ 0, ∀C ∈ E+}.
Notice that, ψ ∈ F+ if and only if ψ(t) ≥ 0 for every t ∈ [0, T ] (cf. Martins-da-Rocha and Riedel
[38], Proposition 1). Moreover, if ψ ∈ F+, then the duality product 〈ψ,C〉, C ∈ E+, is the value
of the cumulative contribution C under the price ψ. According to Martins-da-Rocha and Riedel
[38], Proposition 1, the pair 〈F,E〉 is a Riesz dual pair and thus the following result holds.
Proposition 4.7. The set Swi is a compact subset of E with respect to the weak*-topology
σ(E,F ).
Proof. Notice that Swi ⊂ E+ ⊂ E and that it is the polar of the singleton
{eαc
wi
}
⊂ F+ ⊂ F .
The Banach-Alaoglu Theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border [1]) gives the sought result.
Since Awi is closed with respect to the associated product topology on Swi ⊗Kwi , we finally
obtain
Proposition 4.8. The set Awi is a compact subset of L2(dµx) ⊗ E+ for the weak-topology
σ(L2(dµx),L2(dµx)) and the weak*-topology σ(E,F ).
We now deal with the upper semicontinuity of the utility functional U i, i = 1, . . . , n, of (2.2)
under the product of the weak-topology σ(L2(dµx),L2(dµx)) and the weak*-topology σ(E,F ).
The uniform boundedness principle for weak and weak* topologies (cf., e.g., Aliprantis and
Border [1]) will be a key tool for the proof.
Proposition 4.9. For any C−i fixed, i = 1, . . . , n, the mapping (xi, Ci) 7→ U i(xi, Ci;C−i) with
U i(xi, Ci;C−i) = E
[ ∫ T
0
e−rsui(xi(s), Ci(s) + C−i(s)) ds
]
is upper semicontinuous on L2(dµx) ⊗ E+ for the weak-topology σ(L2(dµx),L2(dµx)) and the
weak*-topology σ(E,F ).
Proof. To prove upper semicontinuity of U i(·, ·;C−i) for any given C−i, it suffices to show that
the set
Gawi := {(xi, Ci) ∈ L2(dµx)⊗ E+ : U i(xi, Ci;C−i) ≥ a}
is closed for any a ∈ R. Therefore, fix a ∈ R and take {(xik, Cik)}k∈N ⊂ Gawi such that xik ⇀ xi in
the weak-topology σ(L2(dµx),L2(dµx)) and Cik ⇀∗ Ci in the weak*-topology σ(E,F ), for some
(xi, Ci) ∈ L2(dµx) ⊗ E+. We want to show that (xi, Ci) ∈ Gawi . First of all, since xik ⇀ xi in
the weak-topology σ(L2(dµx),L2(dµx)), xik is strongly bounded in L2(dµx) and hence, by the
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Banach-Saks Theorem [5], it admits a subsequence converging strongly in L2(dµx) to xi in the
Cesa`ro sense. Without loss of generality we may also assume that (up to a further subsequence
still denoted by xik) the convergence holds dµx-a.e. in the Cesa`ro sense and hence dP ⊗ dt-a.e.
as P˜x ∼ P.
On the other hand, Cik ⇀
∗ Ci in the weak*-topology σ(E,F ), and therefore {Cik}k∈N is
strongly bounded in E; that is, supk≥1 ||Cik||E = supk≥1 E˜c[Cik(T )] < ∞ (cf. (4.11)). By a
version of Komlo`s’ theorem for optional random measures (cf. Kabanov [32], Lemma 3.5), it
follows that that there exists a subsequence of {Cik}k∈N (still denoted by {Cik}k∈N) that converges
weakly P˜c-a.s. in the Cesa`ro sense to an optional random measure dC
i; i.e.,
Iij(t) :=
1
j
j∑
`=1
Cil (t)→ Ci(t), P˜c − a.s., for any t of continuity of Ci(·) and for t = T (4.12)
as j → ∞. Still denoting by Ci the right-continuous version of Ci, then (4.12) also holds
dP˜c ⊗ dt-a.e., as Ci is nondecreasing and right-continuous. Hence, it holds dP ⊗ dt-a.e. being
P˜c ∼ P.
Then, joint continuity and concavity of ui imply
U i(xi, Ci;C−i) = E
[ ∫ T
0
e−rsui
(
lim
k→∞
1
k
k∑
j=1
xij(s), lim
k→∞
1
k
k∑
j=1
Cij(s)
)
ds
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
e−rs lim sup
k→∞
ui
(1
k
k∑
j=1
xij(s),
1
k
k∑
j=1
Cij(s)
)
ds
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−rs lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
j=1
ui(xij(s), C
i
j(s)) ds
]
≥ lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
j=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−rsui(xij(s), C
i
j(s)) ds
]
≥ a,
where the second inequality follows by Fatou’s Lemma thanks to Assumption 1.v., whereas the
last step is due to the fact that (xik, C
i
k) ∈ Gawi . Therefore Gawi is closed and this concludes the
proof.
We may now prove the main result of this section, which is Theorem 2.6 (cf. Section 2).
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Awi is compact by Proposition 4.8. Moreover, the best reply correspon-
dence r(C), with ri(C
−i) := arg max(xi,Ci)∈Awi U
i(xi, Ci;C−i), i = 1, . . . , n, maps
∏n
i=1 Bwi into
itself and it is non-empty, convex, and upper hemicontinuous thanks to Proposition 4.9. The
Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border [1], Corollary 17.55) finally
implies the thesis.
Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution 25
A Proofs and Technical Results
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.4
In this section we prove Proposition 3.4. The proof is a generalization of that in Bank and Riedel
[10], Theorem 3.2, to the case of a multivariate optimal consumption problem. Sufficiency easily
follows from concavity of the utility functions ui, i = 1, . . . , n. On the other hand, the next
Lemma accomplishes the proof of the necessity part. Necessity is proved by linearizing the
original problem (3.1) around its optimal solution (x∗, C∗), by showing that (x∗, C∗) solves the
linearized problem as well and that it satisfies some flat-off conditions similar to those of (3.6).
Recall the notation x(t) :=
∑n
i=1 x
i(t) and C(t) :=
∑n
i=1C
i(t).
Lemma A.1. Let (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw be optimal for problem (3.1) and set
Ψ∗(t) := E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γi uic(x
i
∗(s), C∗(s)) ds
∣∣∣Ft]. (A-1)
Then (x∗, C∗)
i. solves the linear optimization problem
sup
(x,C)∈Bw
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
; (A-2)
ii. satisfies
(
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))−Mψx(t)
)
xˆi(t) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
Ψ∗(t)−Mψc(t)
)
dC∗(t)
]
= 0,
(A-3)
with
M := ess sup
(ω,t)
[
max
{
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγ1u1x(x
1∗(t), C∗(t))
ψx(t)
, . . .
. . . ,
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγnunx(x
n∗ (t), C∗(t))
ψx(t)
,
Ψ∗(t)
ψc(t)
}]
.
(A-4)
Proof. The proof splits into two steps.
Step 1. Let (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw be optimal for problem (3.1). For (x,C) ∈ Bw and  ∈ [0, 1],
define the admissible strategy (x, C) with x(t) := x(t) + (1 − )x∗(t) and such that C(t) =
C(t) + (1− )C∗(t). Notice that x(t) and C(t) converge to x∗(t) and C∗(t), respectively, a.s.
for t ∈ [0, T ] when  ↓ 0. Now, optimality of (x∗, C∗), concavity of ui and an application of
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Fubini’s Theorem allow us to write
0 ≥ 1

[USP (x, C)− USP (x∗, C∗)]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))(x
i(t)− xi∗(t)) dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
(t), C(t))(C(t)− C∗(t)) dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))(x
i(t)− xi∗(t)) dt
]
+E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ(t)(dC(t)− dC∗(t))
]
,
where Φ(t) :=
∫ T
t e
− ∫ s0 r(u) du∑n
i=1 γ
i uic(x
i
(s), C(s)) ds. One has
lim inf
↓0
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))x
i(t)dt
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt
]
,
and
lim inf
↓0
E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ(t)dC(t)
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC(t)
]
,
with Φ∗ := Φ0, by Fatou’s Lemma. If now
lim
↓0
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))x
i
∗(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i
∗(t)dt
]
, (A-5)
and
lim
↓0
E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ(t)dC∗(t)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC∗(t)
]
, (A-6)
then
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t) dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC(t)
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i
∗(t) dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC∗(t)
]
.
By replacing Φ∗ with its optional projection Ψ∗ as in (A-1) (cf. Jacod [30], Theorem 1.33) it
follows that (x∗, C∗) is optimal for problem (A-2) as well.
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To conclude the proof we must prove (A-5) and (A-6). First of all, notice that
∫ T
0 Φ(t)dC∗(t)
=
∫ T
0 e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds∑n
i=1 γ
iuic(x
i
(t), C(t))C∗(t)dt by Fubini’s Theorem. Hence, to have (A-5) and
(A-6) it suffices to show that the families (Γ1 )∈[0, 1
2
] and (Γ
2
 )∈[0, 1
2
] given by
Γ1 (t) := e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))x
i
∗(t) and Γ
2
 (t) := e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
(t), C(t))C∗(t)
are P⊗dt-uniformly integrable. Concavity of ui and the fact that xi(t) ≥ 12xi∗(t) a.s. for  ∈ [0, 12 ]
and every t ∈ [0, T ] lead to
Γ1 (t) ≤ 2e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))x
i
(t) ≤ 2e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiui(xi(t), C(t)). (A-7)
The last term in the right-hand side of (A-7) is P⊗ dt-uniformly integrable by Assumption 1.v.
Then (A-5) holds by Vitali’s Convergence Theorem. Similar arguments show that (Γ2 )∈[0, 1
2
] is
P⊗ dt-uniformly integrable as well.
Step 2. We now show that the flat-off conditions (A-3) hold for any solution (xˆ, Cˆ) of the
linear problem (A-2). Then, by Step 1, they also hold for (x∗, C∗).
Notice that for every (x,C) ∈ Bw one has
E
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
≤ME
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC(t)
]
= Mw (A-8)
by definition of M (cf. (A-4)). Obviously, if (x,C) satisfies (A-3) we then have equality in (A-8).
On the other hand, if
sup
(x,C)∈Bw
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
= Mw, (A-9)
then equality holds through (A-8) and we obtain (A-3).
It therefore remains to prove (A-9). To this end take K < M and define the stopping times τ
i
K := inf{t ∈ [0, T ) : e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t)) ≤ Kψx(t)} ∧ T, i = 1, . . . , n,
σK := inf{t ∈ [0, T ) : Ψ∗(t) > Kψc(t)} ∧ T,
together with the investment strategies
xiK(t) := α1[0,τ iK ]
(t), CK(t) := α1[σK ,T ](t),
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for some α such that E[
∫ T
0
∑n
i=1 ψx(t)x
i
K(t)dt+
∫ T
0 ψc(t)dCK(t)] = w. We then have
Mw ≥ sup
(x,C)∈Bw
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i
K(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dCK(t)
]
≥ K E
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
ψx(t)x
i
K(t)dt+ αψc(σK)1{σK<T}
]
≥ K E
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
ψx(t)x
i
K(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCK(t)
]
= Kw,
which yields (A-9) by letting K ↑M .
We are now able to prove Proposition 3.4.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Sufficiency follows from concavity of utility function ui, i = 1, . . . , n,
(cf. Assumption 1). Indeed, for (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw satisfying (3.6) and for (x,C) any other admissible
policy we may write
USP (x∗, C∗)− USP (x,C) ≥E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))(x
i
∗(t)− xi(t))dt
]
+E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))(C∗(t)− C(t))dt
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))(x
i
∗(t)− xi(t))dt
]
+E
[ ∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(s), C∗(s)) ds
)
(dC∗(t)− dC(t))
]
≥λ(w − w) = 0,
where (3.6) and Fubini’s Theorem lead to the second inequality, whereas the last one is implied
by the first and the fourth of (3.6) and by the budget constraint. Finally, Lemma A.1 yields the
proof of the necessary part.
A.2 Proposition A.2
Proposition A.2. Under Assumption 1 and with hi as in the hypothesis of Theorem 2.1 there
exists an optional process l∗ which solves the backward stochastic equation
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), sup
τ≤u≤t
l∗(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λψc(τ)1{τ<T} (A-10)
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for any τ ∈ T . Moreover, l∗ has upper right-continuous sample paths and then it is unique up
to indistinguishability.
Proof. Recall that the mapping c 7→ hi(ψ, c) is the composition of c 7→ gi(ψ, c) and c 7→ uic(x, c),
and hence it is continuous, strictly decreasing and it satisfies the Inada conditions hypothesized
in Theorem 2.1. These properties are inherited by the function
∑n
i=1 γ
ihi(ψ, ·), being γi > 0,
i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, for any given λ > 0 the process λψc(t)1{t<T} is of class (D), lower
semicontinuous in expectation and it vanishes at T , since Ec is a uniformly integrable martingale
and αc is continuous and bounded. Suitably applying Bank and El Karoui [7], Theorem 3 (see
also the example in Bank and El Karoui [7], Section 3.1), we have existence of an optional signal
process l∗ solving (A-10). Then, easily adopting arguments similar to those in Bank and Ku¨chler
[9], proof of Theorem 1, one can show that such l∗ is upper right-continuous and therefore it is
unique up to indistinguishability by Bank and El Karoui [7], Theorem 1, and Meyer’s optional
section theorem (see, e.g., Dellacherie and Meyer [21], Theorem IV.86).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Recall that hi(ψ, c) := uic(g
i(ψ, c), c) with gi(·, c) the inverse of uix(·, c). For any λi > 0,
straightforward computations lead to hi(λiertψx(t), C(t)) = δ(λ
iEx(t))
α
α−1C
α+β−1
1−α (t), with δ :=
β
α
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
. Set Ci∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t l∗(s) ∨ 0 for some progressively measurable process l∗(t)
solving
E
[ ∫ ∞
τ
δe−rs(λiEx(s))
α
α−1
(
n sup
τ≤u≤s
l∗(u)
)α+β−1
1−α
ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λie−rτEc(τ),
i.e.,
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru(λi)
α
α−1
Ex
α
α−1 (u+ τ)
Ec(τ) inf0≤s≤u
(
nl∗
α+β−1
1−α (s+ τ)
)
du
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λi. (A-11)
Now define l∗(t) := κnEc
1−α
α+β−1 (t)Ex
α
α+β−1 (t) for some constant κ and use independence and sta-
tionarity of Le´vy increments to rewrite (A-11) as
κ
α+β−1
1−α E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E
α
α−1
x (u− s)
)
du
]
= (λi)
1
1−α . (A-12)
By defining A := E[
∫∞
0 δe
−ru inf0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E−
α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du] (cf. (2.14)), and by solving
(A-12) for λi one obtains
λi := A1−ακα+β−1.
But now xi∗(t) = [λi
(
α+β
α
)
Ex(t)C−β∗ (t)]
1
α−1 , and therefore
xi∗(t) =
1
A
(λi)−
1
1−α
[(
α+ β
α
)
Ex(t)l−β0 inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
;
that is,
xi∗(t) = κγ(t) (A-13)
with γ(t) as in (2.11).
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To determine κ we use the budget constraint E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)x
i∗(t)dt +
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dC
i∗(t)] = w.
Indeed, by (A-13) we have
κE
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
1
n
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
= w, (A-14)
since Ci∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t l∗(s) =
κ
n sup0≤s≤t(E
− 1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)) = κθ(t) with θ(t) as in (2.12).
Now the result follows by solving (A-14) for κ.
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